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1. Introduction 
 
Growing recognition of the role of institutions in economic development is animating 
research interest across social science disciplines. Many advances have been made but 
significant issues require further work. In relation to economic development at different 
spatial scales, important questions remain concerning: the definitions of institutions and 
their manifestations and configurations in different geographical contexts; the existence, 
degree, direction and character of causal linkages between institutions and economic 
development in specific spatial settings; and, the causes and impacts of the disruption, 
instability and restructuring of institutions over space and time. Within the broader work 
on institutions, the aim here is to better understand the roles of institutions in economic 
development at the local level. The local scale provides a fruitful lens to elaborate how 
institutions seek to structure and shape the agency and relationships of economic actors, 
to examine the role of extra-local relations and processes in establishing and conditioning 
how institutions operate, and to explore how institutions adapt and cope with change, 
disruption and uncertainty.  
 
Drawing upon comparative analysis of the 39 new Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) 
established for economic development in England since 2010, the argument derives 
insights from the interplay between concepts, theory and empirics (Sunley 2008). It does 
not seek to provide just another individual and isolated case study of a particular 
institution in a specific geographical and temporal context. Instead, responding to calls 
for stronger comparative methods (Barnes et al. 2007), the approach aims to learn 
conceptually and theoretically from systematic analysis of the changing institutional 
architecture for economic development within and between multiple local areas in a 
single national context. The specific contributions are, first, explaining the importance 
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and ways in which local economic development institutions are situated and work within 
multi-agent and multi-scalar institutional settings. Second, demonstrating how 
institutional genealogy shapes processes of layering and recombining as well as 
dismantling and improvising in episodes restructuring the institutional landscape for local 
economic development. Last, identifying analytical themes to illuminate understanding of 




2. Local institutions and local economic development 
 
Recognition and interest in the role of institutions in economic development have risen 
in the last decade. Across disciplines including Economics, Economic Sociology, 
Economic Geography and Political Science, work has demonstrated how institutions 
shape the behaviour of economic actors and their inter-relationships, and are integral to 
the economy through influencing processes of production, circulation, exchange, 
consumption and regulation (see, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, Helpman 
2004, Hodgson 2007, Rodrik 2003, Farole et al. 2011, Gertler 2010, Martin 2000, 
Rodríguez-Pose 2013, Streeck and Thelen 2005). Despite the increased attention, 
institutions remain poorly understood and under-appreciated in specific disciplinary 
domains relevant to economic development at specific spatial levels and in particular 
geographical contexts. This gap has been acknowledged in Economic Geography (Peck 
1998, Amin 1999, Gertler 2010, Cumbers et al. 2003, Martin 2000, Wood and Valler 
2001) and Human Geography (Farole et al. 2011, Tomaney 2013). Much insight has been 
generated by ongoing research but important questions remain. Issues include, first, 
clarifying and operationalizing the definitions of institutions and how they are manifest 
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and configured in different spatial settings. An important distinction identifies formal, 
‘hard’ and written institutions and informal, ‘soft’ and unwritten institutions (Rodríguez-
Pose 2013)(Table 1). In local economic development, formal institutions encompass the 
system of government and governance in a particular nation-state and informal 
institutions include the traditions of co-operative working between public and private 
sectors. These formal and informal institutions interact. Both are produced by actors and 
condition and regulate their agency. Such socially-produced structures influence rather 
than determine attitudes, behaviours and decision-making in ways that impart stability 
and predictability, and enable their (re)production over time and space (Gertler 2010). 
Specific manifestations and configurations of formal and informal institutions are 
assembled through the agency of actors working in and with already existing institutional 
structures in different spatial settings. Such locally distinctive “institutional architectures” 
(Gertler 2010: 2) are critically important to understanding their role in local economic 
development. For analysis, Martin (2000: 79-80) distinguishes two parts of the 
“institutional regime”:  
 
The ‘institutional environment’ [that] refers to both the systems of informal 
conventions, customs, norms, and social routines…and the formal…structures 
of rules, regulations…which constrain and control socioeconomic 
behaviour…[and the] ‘institutional arrangements’…used to denote the particular 
organisational forms…which arise as a consequence of, and whose constitution 
and operation are governed by, the institutional environment.  
 
Within particular variegations of capitalism (Peck and Theodore 2007), how the 
institutional environment and arrangements interact and shape economic behaviours and 
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outcomes across and between different spatial levels and in particular geographical 
contexts requires further examination. 
 
 
< Table 1 about here > 
 
 
Second, the causal linkages and interactions between institutions and economic 
development at different geographical scales remain unresolved. Whether they exist, their 
extent and nature, and in what directions they operate are unclear: “once basic formal 
institutions are in place, the relationship between institutions and economic outcomes 
becomes much more complex, fuzzy and difficult to isolate” (Rodríguez-Pose 2013: 
1038). Institutions pervade the relations and processes of economic development across 
and between spatial levels. But they typically constitute one set of influences amongst 
many making it difficult to determine their precise causal roles and their extent and 
nature (Gertler 2010). Establishing the direction of causation is beset by problems of 
endogeneity because the relationship between actors and structures is recursive; 
institutions shape and regulate and, in turn, are shaped and regulated by the agency of 
economic actors (Farole et al. 2011). The quantitative degree of causal linkages ranges 
from strong to weak effects and high to low magnitudes (Beugelsdijk and van Schaik 
2005). The qualitative nature of institutional influence is diverse, imbuing economic 
development in different geographical contexts with varied characteristics including high 
or low quality, (in)equality and (un)sustainability (Cumbers et al. 2003).     
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Last, the ways in institutional environments and arrangements change and shape the 
evolutionary paths of economies over time and space and how economies influence 
institutions are under-researched (Tomaney 2013). Specifically, little is known about how 
and why institutional architectures or regimes cohere during periods of stability and 
fixity. Institutional change, disruption and instability raise only partially answered 
questions too. What are the exogenous and/or endogenous sources that generate change 
(Gertler 2010)? How and by whom is institutional restructuring effected and what are its 
implications? Work has only begun to address how processes of layering, conversion and 
recombination shape emergent and new institutional regimes (Martin 2010, Streeck and 
Thelen 2005). 
 
Engaging the multi-disciplinary institutionalist project, this paper articulates three specific 
contributions. First, a central and longstanding concern is understanding how and where 
institutions interact in (re)producing particular institutional configurations and distinctive 
practices in different geographical settings at different spatial scales (Peck 1996, Gertler 
2010). Analyses have often relied “on economy-wide quantitative studies at the macro 
level” and “not yet explained in a satisfactory way which institutions matter, when they 
matter, and precisely how they shape growth” (Farole et al. 2011: 59, emphasis in original). 
Building upon the governance geographies of institution building and institutionalisation 
(Haughton et al. 1997, Peck 1998), understanding is sought about the role of institutions 
in local economic development and their inter-relations with institutions at other 
geographical levels. Focusing upon inter-scalar relations, this approach seeks a “more 
finely grained appreciation of the geography of institutional variation” (Gertler 2010: 5). 
Evident in different shapes and sizes (Pike et al. 2012c), the extent and nature of 
decentralisation within government and governance systems play decisive parts in 
explaining the role of institutions in economic development at specific geographical 
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levels within multi-agent and multi-scalar institutional settings. Between the centre and 
local levels, powers can be reserved, shared or decentralised and resources can be 
centrally controlled, negotiated or subject to local discretion (Figure 1). The particular 
configuration in specific national contexts shapes the institutional environment and 
arrangements within which economic development at the local level is pursued and by 
whom. Relative autonomy makes the agency of local actors integral and means 
institutional outcomes cannot be read-off in a deterministic and top-down way from 
institutional structures (Gertler 2010).   
 
 
< Figure 1 about here > 
 
 
Second, emphasising how and where institutions shape the trajectories of local 
economies over time (Gertler 2010), the focus here is on periods of substantive change 
in institutional architectures. Restructuring institutional environments and/or 
arrangements unleashes episodes of uncertainty, fluidity and experimentation. 
Understanding shifting institutional landscapes requires historical sensitivity to change 
and continuity as well as the legacies and ways in which previous paths, approaches and 
practices prefigure and condition the changed and emergent structures (Jones 1999). 
Institutional genealogies are necessary to uncover the lineage of institutions and their 
inter-relations over time and space. Building upon and elaborating David’s (1994: 205) 
notion of institutions as “carriers of history” shaping path dependencies, the importance 
of micro-level processes has been demonstrated: i) “layering” (gradual and cumulative 
addition of new rules, procedures and/or structures to existing institutions), ii) 
“conversion” (reorientation of institutional form and/or function through addition of 
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new or modification of existing rules, procedures and practices) and “recombination” 
(reamalgamation of existing and/or new resources and properties to produce new 
institutions and/or roles, functions and practices) over time in places (Martin 2010: 14-
15; see also Peck and Theodore 2007, Streeck and Thelen 2005). Two further processes 
can be identified. Dismantling is where institutional arrangements are abolished, closed 
down and removed from the landscape. Often focused on national level welfare state 
reform (Streeck and Thelen 2005), this process involves substantial efforts, time, 
resources and (un)foreseen costs and benefits that create legacies which pattern the 
evolution of institutional architectures. Drawing upon ideas of bricolage and unstructured 
social agency (Garud et al. 2009), improvising is where new institutional entities are 
introduced and actors encouraged and/or compelled to interpret and define their aim, 
purpose and function within the changed (and often still changing) institutional 
environments and arrangements of shifting national political-economic contexts, policy 
frameworks and resource allocations. Such complex processes – layering, converting, 
recombining, dismantling and improvising – raise yet further questions about how to 
disentangle and explain institutional operation and effects in geographical contexts.   
 
Third, institutionalist approaches to economic development have expressed disquiet 
about methods, research designs and comparative analysis (Barnes et al. 2007, Gertler 
2010, Peck and Theodore 2007). Work in Economic Geography has been strong on 
explaining and documenting “complexity, context and difference” but weaker in 
specifying more generalised analytical and explanatory frameworks applicable to different 
geographical contexts internationally, identifying consistent and comparable conceptual 
and analytical categories, analysing larger empirical samples, and systematising and 
generalising its findings (Farole et al. 2011: 60). Balance is needed between identifying 
generalizable analytical themes capable of distilling, comparing and explaining common 
	   9 
features and experiences and developing the capability to interrogate the variegation and 
particularity of institutional architectures for economic development both constituting 
and encompassing the local level. Synthesising the academic and policy literature (for 
example Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, Rodrik 2003, OECD 2012), a range of analytical 
themes can be extracted to provide a framework for understanding and explaining the 
roles and functions of institutions in local economic development. Reducing uncertainty 
for local actors, institutions undertake important work in: diagnosing local economic 
development circumstances and issues; leading actors in deliberation and selection of 
priorities; formulating development strategies appropriate to local contexts and 
situations; generating, pooling and aligning resources and investments; and, evaluating 
the impact of interventions. Within multi-actor and multi-level systems of government 
and governance, institutions provide a local voice vertically in dealing with supranational, 
national and regional structures and horizontally in co-ordinating and mobilising other 
local actors in the public, private and civic sectors. These analytical themes provide a 
starting point. They are not exhaustive of all the potential roles of institutions in local 
economic development and will blur and overlap.  
 
With the aim of better understanding the role of local institutions in local economic 
development, the empirical analysis is focused upon the 39 LEPs established for 
economic development in England since 2010. England provides an appropriate case as 
a constituent territory of the asymmetrically devolved union-state of the United 
Kingdom with highly centralised governance, persistent and relatively high levels of 
spatial disparities in economic and social conditions and a long history of ongoing 
change in economic development policy and institutions (Pike and Tomaney 2009, Pike 
et al. 2012a). Extending our understanding from existing research on individual or groups 
of LEPs (see, for example, Bentley et al. 2010), the research undertook the first 
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comparative national study of all 39 LEPs across England. Informed by the analytical 
themes above, the survey addressed the roles the new and emergent LEPs were seeking 
to interpret and perform by gathering and analysing information on their strategies and 
priorities, organisation and governance, resources, effectiveness and working relations, 
innovations, lessons learned, capacity building issues, future barriers and challenges. The 
comparative methodology and research design were based on: i) semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with the lead actors the Chairs and/or Chief/Senior Officers in all 39 LEPs 
(100% response rate; 13 (33%) conducted face-to-face) undertaken between December 
2012 and February 2013; ii) review of secondary sources (e.g. LEP websites, The LEP 
Network reports, Government documents and independent studies including BIS (2010), 
Odgers Berndtson (2012) and Walker (2013); iii) a follow-up exercise to gather additional 
data on finances and staffing; and, iv) a practitioner workshop to test the emergent 
findings (March 2013). 
 
 
3. The Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) in England, 2010- 
 
Several years on from the proposal sent by the UK Government’s Secretaries of State for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and Communities and Local Government (CLG) 
“to invite local groups of councils and business leaders to come together to consider how 
you wish to form local enterprise partnerships” in order “to work with the Government 
to help strengthen local economies” (Cable and Pickles 2010), another new landscape of 
economic development governance has emerged in England. Since 2010, 39 new LEPs 
were eventually established and recognised by central government in the wake of the 
dismantling of the 8 sets of regional level arrangements outside London and the transfer 
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of the London Development Agency to the Greater London Authority (Pike et al. 2012a, 
b)(Figure 2).  
 
 
< Figure 2 about here > 
 
 
3.1 Inst i tut ional  genealogy :  the or ig ins and emergence o f  the  39 LEPs in 
England 
 
Economic development governance in England is marked by entrenched spatial 
disparities and centralisation (Pike and Tomaney 2009). Reflecting a history of 
“compulsive re-organisation” (Jones 2010: 374) and “perpetual restructuring” (Mulgan 
2010: 1), repeated institutional experiments have tried to address the “missing middle” 
(Shaw and Greenhalgh 2010: 457) between central and local government in economic 
development. Building on the regional planning system established in the late 1940s, this 
process resembles a pendulum in the post-war period swinging between the regional 
(early 1960s), local (c. 1979-1994), regional (1997-2010) and local (2010-) scales. As a 
particular local institutional fix, LEPs emerged as part of the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat Coalition’s Programme for Government agreed in 2010. In the wake of the 
global financial crisis and economic downturn, Coalition strategy embodied the “austerity 
or consolidation state” (Schäfer and Streeck 2013: 9) prioritising deficit reduction mainly 
through public expenditure cuts and institutional rationalisation. Economic development 
policy focused on recovery and underpinned a ‘Local Growth’ agenda, aimed at 
“realising every place’s potential” (BIS 2010: 1), and shaped by aspirations of sectoral and 
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spatial ‘rebalancing’, decentralisation and localism (Clarke and Cochrane 2013, Pike et al. 
2012a). 
 
Central government articulated a critique of the previous episode of regionally-based 
institutional architecture for economic development based on its regional level 
centralism, bureaucracy, mismatch with functional economic areas, overly broad aims 
and objectives, failure to close the gap in economic growth rates between regions, over-
resourcing, over-staffing, lack of regional and local accountability, and limited 
effectiveness (BIS 2010, Pike et al. 2012b). To make way for the new local focus, the 
regional institutional arrangements of Government Offices, Regional Development 
Agencies, Regional Chambers and other regional entities were rapidly abolished 
(Sandford 2013). Region, regionalism and regionalisation were removed from the lexicon 
of sub-national economic development in England. This process of institutional 
dismantling embroiled the new LEPs in the complex and messy activities involved in 
winding-up the RDAs, transferring their assets and liabilities, (re)negotiating contractual 
commitments, staff redeployments and redundancies, and archiving and managing 
regional knowledge bases (BIS 2012, Pike et al. 2012b). 
 
This particular political-economic context for local economic development in England 
imparted distinctive legacies that shaped the emergent institutional landscape for the 
LEPs.  First, the Coalition’s version of decentralisation and localism meant no longer 
term vision and plan for LEPs was set out by central government. Instead, local 
discretion, initiative and innovation were emphasised. The emergence of LEPs 
consequently reveals a cluttered and fragmented path of institutional evolution. The pace 
of change has been rapid since 2010: moving from start-up, embryonic organisations to 
bidders and delivery managers for substantial national and EU funding initiatives to 
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strategic leaders of their LEP area economies. LEPs expressed concerns that this 
unplanned and accelerated trajectory has precluded their organic evolution as institutions. 
The absence of an England-wide vision and plan has generated instability and uncertainty 
for the emergent local institutions, acknowledged by the national minister: “[G]etting rid 
of the RDAs and bringing in LEPs has perhaps been a little Maoist and chaotic” (Vince 
Cable, Secretary of State for BIS, quoted in Stratton 2010: 1). 
 
Second, marked unevenness was evident across the 39 LEPs in the speed at which they 
were agreed with national government, established and became operational. Reflecting 
processes of dismantling, improvising, layering and recombining, the LEPs building-up 
from and adapting existing (sub-)regional partnerships were relatively quicker off the 
mark. Such sub-regional partnerships either pre-dated and/or were deployed as part of 
the now dismantled regional structures. LEPs working in new geographies with new local 
partners faced lengthy improvisation to find their feet. While national government later 
articulated more centralised versions of “guided localism” (Eric Pickles, CLG Secretary 
of State, quoted in Illman 2010: 1), the initial period reflected a localist vanguard and 
deliberate lack of central guidance. As new institutional arrangements in an emergent, 
evolving and localist context, each of the 39 LEPs had to travel down its own particular 
road of determining what they were for and how they were going to add value to local 
economic development amongst the public, private and civic actors in the LEP area as 
well as organisational development and resolving basic issues of resources, staffing, 
structures, governance, identity and brand, and premises.  
 
Last, in the dismantling and conversion of the institutional architecture for economic 
development from the regional to the local level, the regional institutional arrangements 
were abolished and replaced – at least on paper and in rhetoric – by a looser localism. 
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Rejecting the preceding legacy as regional centralism, local institutional agency has been 
strongly encouraged by central government. For the embryonic LEPs with limited 
capacity and resources, this has meant improvisation. In the early stages of their 
evolution, the LEPs have had to engage in intensive ‘learning by doing’, negotiating a 
complex, uncertain and rapidly unfolding policy and funding landscape. Further 
complications have arisen in the mixed and conflicting messages LEPs receive from 
different central government departments and Ministers. Institutional genealogy reveals 
the inherited legacies of repeated experimentation, changing national political-economic 
projects and priorities, institutional dismantling and conversion, lack of long term vision 
and plan, and exhortations of localist agency that have shaped the extent, nature and 




3.2 Local  inst i tut ional agency in mult i -agent and mult i - s ca lar inst i tut ional  
se t t ings :  c entral i sm, local i sm and the LEPs 
 
Given their relatively limited resources and emergence in a fragmented and evolving 
landscape of economic development governance with multiple agents active at different 
geographical levels (Table 2), working relationships with relevant partners in the public, 
private and civic sectors were critical to LEP establishment. One LEP described this as 
“partnership capital” (Authors’ Interview, 2013). From the outset, LEPs were focused 
upon trying to interpret the shifting landscape, identify and craft their role. Negotiating 
the uneasy relationships between shifting forms of centralism and localism since 2010, 
LEPs have sought to provide the lead, mobilising actors horizontally at the local level 
and establishing relations vertically to the national level. In centre-local relations, many 
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LEPs welcomed the direct connections to central government departments and officials. 
This channel was considered more effective than having to engage with and work 
through the previous regional institutional tier. Central government civil servants 
continue to struggle to find effective ways to deal with all 39 LEPs. Marked unevenness 
was evident. Some LEPs were establishing strong relationships with Ministers and 
officials, ensuring their localist behaviours were in tune with central government agendas. 
Relations between LEPs and other institutions centralised following the dismantling of 
the RDAs such as the Technology Strategy Board and UK Trade and Investment were 
patchy. Only some LEPs had agreed formal co-operation agreements. Amidst central 
government encouragement of competition between LEPs, uneven centre-local relations 
have meant a cadre of more capable LEPs pulling ahead of the rest in developing their 
contact networks and deal-making skills with central government in building capacity and 
influence over economic development in their local areas. 
 
 
< Table 2 about here > 
 
 
Relations between LEPs and their respective BIS Locals – the subnational structures of 
the central government department BIS – were positive. Supportive relations were 
established even as the BIS Local teams dealt with the layering of enlarged institutional 
geographies and reduced staff and resources following the abolition of regions. LEP and 
constituent local authority relations were pivotal to their roles and effectiveness (Walker 
2013). Several emergent types can be discerned. First, LEPs that are explicitly a sub-set 
of mayoral and Combined Authority governance arrangements (e.g. London, Greater 
Manchester, Leeds, North East and Sheffield. Where the LEP is absorbed into existing 
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structures it is deemed to have greater accountability and legitimacy. Second, several 
LEPs are operating as de facto business-led, arms-length organisations of the local 
authority Leaders’ Board. Last are LEPs that are still finding their way and are currently 
sitting alongside often newly formed LA leadership structures. Such LEP arrangements 
are marked by institutional histories and remain fluid as the Local Growth and Cities 
agendas continue to evolve.  
 
As purportedly business-led organisations, LEP interactions with local business parallel 
their critical relations with local authorities. Shaped by their particular local genesis and 
legacies of the regional era, in some LEPs the Chamber of Commerce played an integral 
role and, in specific cases, is even providing the LEP secretariat. Elsewhere, as some 
LEPs seek to enrol businesses as subscribing members, this risks putting them into 
competition with business associations. Several LEPs explicitly claim to be the local 
‘business voice’ whilst most seek to be either ‘a’ voice for business or a mediator of 
business voices. Securing and sustaining business engagement is challenging for LEPs 
given their lesser size, resources and clout compared to RDAs. Numerous LEPs have 
already experienced turnover in their business board members and Chairs as terms of 
office end. A substantial number of LEPs have begun considering joint cross-boundary 
working and even merging operations. Whilst some local authorities, such as the City of 
York, have looked to cement their membership in one LEP (Leeds City Region) rather 
than be members of two LEPs (Leeds City Region and North and East Yorkshire) given 
their overlapping geographies. 
 
How institutions are organised and governed is integral to their capability, role and 
contribution to local economic development. In common with strategy and priorities, 
whilst there is no single or universal LEP organisation and governance model, there are 
	   17 
not 39 different variants. In the evolving context, all LEPs are reviewing second or even 
third generation arrangements in the light of central government’s response to Lord 
Heseltine’s (2013) Growth Review and the Comprehensive Spending Review 2013. 
Different legal forms are being utilised across the LEPs: incorporation with single (e.g. 
local authority) or multiple shareholders; unincorporated voluntary partnerships; and, 
part of broader local authority or city-region/Mayoral strategic governance arrangements 
(e.g. Combined Authority, Greater London Authority/Mayor). Almost all LEPs have 
either a single or set of multiple local authorities as the ‘Accountable Body’ for the 
stewardship of public money. The modi operandi of the LEPs is evident through a range of 
organisational structures and practices: local authority Leaders Boards; Board leads 
(public and private); Standing sub-groups; ‘Task and Finish’ groups; Delivery Partners; 
and, Business Membership body support arrangements. LEP Board size varies from over 
forty for the South East LEP to under ten in Worcestershire (Figure 3). Although 
Government specified at least 50% of LEP Boards to be private sector, the distribution 
of public and private representatives varies geographically too. In Northamptonshire 
LEP, 73% of the Board is from the private sector whilst in the West of England LEP 
60% of the Board is from the public sector. In terms of board representativeness for the 
populations within their areas, a crude measure of Board representatives per capita for 
the LEP areas ranges from over 1:700,000 in London and 1:200,000 in D2N2 and 
Greater Manchester to under 1:50,000 in over a quarter of LEPs.  
 
 
< Figure 3 about here > 
 
 
	   18 
Organisation and governance remain unsettled for LEPs. Unease concerns accountability 
and culture. To whom is the LEP accountable? The LEP survey revealed several 
possibilities: genuinely not knowing; a local authority Leaders’ Board (or, in London, the 
Mayor); ‘business’ (however defined); and, central government and the Secretaries of 
State in BIS and/or CLG. Such uncertainty masks fundamental questions. What is the 
LEP? Is it the Board? Is it the organisations represented on the Board? Is it a loose local 
coalition of public, private and third sector actors with contributions to make to local 
economic development? In their shifting versions of centralism and localism, central 
government lacks clarity in its normative expectations of what LEPs should be in order to 
assume enhanced responsibilities and resources. The current conjuncture is a long way 
from the voluntarist invitation from the Secretaries of State at BIS and CLG in 2010. On 
culture, LEPs were struggling to retain their agility, flexibility and entrepreneurialism in 
the face of what they term creeping “bureaucratisation” arising from the widening and 
increasing level of responsibilities and resources envisaged by central government for the 
LEPs (Authors’ Interview 2013). Echoing the regional era, the evolving roles and 
functions for the LEPs are mirroring the ‘mission creep’ of unintentional expansion 
beyond their original legislative purpose experienced by the RDAs (Pike et al. 2012b). 
 
Leading in devising and formulating strategy and deciding upon priorities and future 
paths in concert with relevant actors from the public, private and civic spheres are critical 
to institutional roles in local economic development. Diversity in economic conditions 
and potential shaped LEP strategy-setting and prioritising activities. Wide disparities exist 
between the LEP areas in their GVA per head (Figure 4). More prosperous LEP areas 
have sought to address the qualitative nature of local growth, prioritising target sectors 
and providing infrastructure to sustain growth. Less prosperous LEP areas have tried to 
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< Figure 4 about here > 
 
 
Shaped by their particular genesis and character, four broad strategy types were evident 
across the 39 LEPs focused: i) on the LEP area as an economic geography; ii) on the 
LEP as an institution; iii) on rolling forward an existing strategy; and, iv) on a new 
formulation exercise. Reflecting the legacies of regional dismantling, half of the LEPs 
inherited their initial strategies from previous area-based economic development 
strategies framed by a RDA sub-regional partnership or local authority Local Economic 
Assessment. Any new strategies were commissioned externally or pulled together by an 
executive or sub-group then further developed through the EU Structural Investment 
Framework and Strategic Economic Plan processes informed by central government 
guidance. Despite central government’s ‘What Works’ policy development agenda 
(Cabinet Office 2013), collation and analysis of evidence bases, formulation and 
consultation was inconsistent. Substantive numbers of LEPs were active in engaging key 
local actors in developing and ‘owning’ local strategies and priorities. Institutional 
dismantling and layering meant the new geographies of LEP areas devalued the existing 
regional and city-regional evidence bases.  
 
In terms of strategic prioritisation, LEPs adopted a sector-focus at a range of levels (e.g. 
food processing, advanced manufacturing, renewables), a thematic focus (e.g. skills, 
inward investment, infrastructure, connectivity), or a mix of both. When strategy was 
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focused on the LEP as an organisation, prominent activities (e.g. Enterprise Zones) or 
support for specific projects was emphasised. Reflecting improvisation in a localist 
context, differentiation in LEP roles was evident between strategic leader, business voice, 
programme commissioner and/or fixer and honest broker. Priorities were articulated in 
different ways by the LEPs with some aggregation into programmes and some split into 
discrete projects.  
 
In contrast to the preceding regional era, no common performance management 
framework has been established for the LEPs. Emphasising a particular localism, central 
government explicitly did not set targets against which LEP performance could be 
evaluated. But an expectation was clear that HM Treasury conceptions of impact and 
value for money should be demonstrated. With increased responsibilities and funding, 
LEPs were seeking enhanced accountability, transparency and the ability to demonstrate 
added value (House of Commons BIS Select Committee 2013). The early picture was 
mixed across the 39 LEPs. A few had developed performance management frameworks, 
several had published annual progress reviews and others have identified measures of 
success and progress in programme and project deliverables and outcomes. In the 
government’s centralised form of localism, all 39 LEPs were having to revisit their initial 
strategic and prioritisation exercises to meet the frameworks set by central government in 
‘Strategic Economic Plans’ and ‘Local Growth Deals’ 
 
Generating, pooling and directing resources are central to the capability and capacity of 
institutions to influence economic development at the local level. In common with other 
multi-agent and multi-level governance systems in advanced economies (McLean et al. 
2003), it is difficult and complex to identify sub-national resources. Multiple, varied and 
fluid sources of finance were evident at the local level that varied greatly in their 
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magnitude and disclosure across the LEPs. As one LEP respondent put it “The situation 
changes everyday” (Authors’ Interview, 2013). Key distinctions are, first, between funds 
allocated to the LEPs by central government and funds generated by the LEPs from 
sources other than central government. Second are the different forms in which financial 
resources are provided, for example as cash with certain spending conditions or in-kind 
support from a seconded individual or organisation. Third is the issue of measuring the 
value of the pro-bono publico and voluntary contributions made to the LEPs, for instance 
by the private sector Chair, Board members and other local institutions. 
 
Reflecting improvisation and layering at the national level, central government is using 
four categories of approaches and mechanisms to allocate resources to LEPs. First is 
‘core-uniform’ allocation of amounts to each LEP from BIS to meet operational costs 
and prepare strategies. The LEP Capacity Fund totalled £4m, whilst the LEP Start-Up 
Fund provided £5m disbursed on the basis of competitive bids and match-funding. 
More recently, the LEPs shared a further £5m for executive support and, subject to 
match funding, an additional £250,000 each in 2013/14 and 2014/15. Although the 
LEPs are diverse in size and capability, this resource was distributed equally. The second 
category is ‘core-varied’ allocation where specified formulae were used and each LEP 
received different amounts of funding. The Growing Places Fund (GPF) was allocated 
on a formula based on population density and ‘employed earnings’ (employment 
multiplied by earnings) (DfT and DCLG 2011). Analysing the geographical distribution 
of the GPF demonstrates that LEP areas with stronger economic performance received 
relatively more of the public funding (Figure 5). This allocation mechanism is an 
innovation in spatial economic policy terms. It does not aim to redistribute public 
resources from richer to poorer areas. Instead, in the context of the austerity state, 
recession and faltering economic recovery in the UK, it explicitly focuses resources on 
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areas with the greatest potential for immediate economic growth – “helping the strongest 
first” (The Economist 2011: 1). 
 
 
< Figure 5 about here > 
 
 
The third category is ‘competitive-general’ allocation where funds from specific initiatives 
are allocated to successful LEPs following a competitive bidding process. The amounts 
disbursed vary and the LEP retains some flexibility in how the funds are deployed. In 
this way, 11 of the 25 new Enterprise Zones (EZs) were allocated. The competitive 
allocation mechanism aimed to encourage local innovation, stimulate creative ideas and 
reward the best bids. The results created ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in a geographically uneven 
map of public resource allocation. Reflecting the improvisational and incremental nature 
of central government policy, however, of the 39 LEPs, 11 (28%) were awarded a ‘first 
wave’ EZ without any formal competition. In total, 26 (67%) bids were submitted for a 
‘second wave’ EZ, and 13 (50%) were successful (SQW 2011). The map of EZs displays 
a geographically dispersed pattern. The ‘first wave’ of EZs was mostly awarded to LEPs 
in the north and the midlands, whilst the ‘second wave’ of EZs went predominantly to 
LEPs in the south. This geography reflected central government’s rebalancing agenda 
and desire to spread funding around the country. This map in turn has uneven 
implications for the resources available to LEPs in terms of potential but uncertain 
future revenue streams. 
 
The last category is ‘competitive-specific’ allocation using a competitive bidding 
mechanism. The amounts vary by LEP and the funding has tighter conditions for its 
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specific use. The Regional Growth Fund (RGF) is allocated on this basis. It too created 
local ‘winners’ and some LEPs deciding not to bid often due to limited capacity. 
Although not restricted to LEPs, in line with its aims the geographical distribution of 
RGF demonstrates a slant towards less prosperous LEP areas and those with relatively 
high public sector employment (BIS 2013)(Figure 6). Significantly, the competitive 
principle was identified as the preferred mechanism for resource allocation in the 




< Figure 6 about here > 
 
 
In generating, pooling and directing resources by the LEPs, a range of different forms 
was evident. First, LEPs were drawing upon financial contributions from their 
constituent local authorities often with specified conditions imposed on their use. 
Second, LEPs were receiving contributions from private sector business within their 
areas, either through a subscription and/or membership-type model. Third, beyond 
direct financial contributions, staff secondments from local partners such as local 
authorities, other public agencies and Chambers of Commerce were widely in use. 
Fourth, in-kind support – such as administration and premises – were provided by local 
partners including further and higher education institutions. Last, contributions were 
made on a pro-bono publico basis from further and/or higher education institutions and 
through volunteering by public, private and civic actors. In the context of the austerity 
state, the self-help and internal generation of resources by and for the LEPs is an 
element of central government’s longer term vision, aligning with international 
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aspirations toward the self-financing of local and regional economic development 
institutions (Bellini et al. 2012).  
 
Given the complexities and difficulties involved in identifying and accessing the central 
government allocation mechanisms and the generation of resources by the LEPs, the 
analysis can only provide a partial picture of the estimated financial resources amongst a 
sub-set of the 39 LEPs. The relatively better endowed LEPs have an EZ, RGF and other 
programme funding, some independent sources of local revenue in addition to 
Government core funding streams and GPF allocations. In sum, the combination of 
central government allocations and internally generated sources can amount to an 
estimated footprint of well over £10m per annum for 2013/14 to 2015/16. Less well-
endowed LEPs are restricted effectively to Government core and GPF sources. Figure 7 
illustrates the level of resources LEPs appear to have available directly to allocate or 
indirectly to influence on the basis of their Growth and European Funding Strategies. 




< Figure 7 about here > 
 
 
In terms of staff, some LEPs claimed to have up to 60 direct staff (e.g. Liverpool City 
Region), around one third of LEPs have 5-9 staff and a further third 1-4 staff (Figure 8). 
A key distinction is between staff directly employed and under the direction of the LEP 
and those staff that work for a LEP and a Leaders’ Board, local authority, public agency 
and/or pre-existing partnership. Here, the resources and capacity available to LEPs 
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and/or to other partnerships and organisations becomes blurred. Management and co-
ordination of the interests of the various local institutions involved is a thorny issue for 
effective local economic development.  
 
 





Engaging a vibrant institutionalist research agenda in economic development, this paper 
has sought better understanding of the roles of local institutions in economic 
development at the local scale. Conceptual and theoretical developments and reflections 
have been underpinned by comparative empirical analysis of all 39 LEPs established for 
local economic development in England since 2010. Responding to the call for “a richer 
account of where good institutions come from, the shape they take, and how they need 
to evolve to support long-term growth” (Rodrik 2003: 12), three specific contributions 
have been made. First, economic development institutions working at the local scale are 
situated within multi-agent and multi-scalar institutional environments and arrangements. 
The extent, nature and evolving shape of this institutional space frames the capacity and 
scope of local institutional agency to influence and shape economic development. 
Echoing the market-oriented and privatist localism in England in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Peck 1998), the experience of “guided localism” (Eric Pickles, CLG Secretary of State, 
quoted in Illman 2010: 1) across the 39 LEPs demonstrates how particular and 
somewhat pliable forms of centralism and localism are marked characteristics of local 
economic development in England. Mulgan (2010: 1) characterises this particular “British 
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vice” as “centralisation masquerading as decentralisation”. While the national level is 
often decisive in centre-local relations, in other political-economic contexts 
internationally city, city-regional or regional level institutions may play vital roles too. 
How and in what ways is a question for future cross-national research. 
 
Second, institutional genealogy provides a worthwhile means to grasp the historical 
evolution of the institutional landscape and the ways in which continuities, endowments 
and legacies from past and existing institutional environments and arrangements 
prefigure and shape new and emergent settings during periods of change and transition. 
Such path dependencies are not simply deterministic, however. Processes of layering, 
converting and recombining as well as dismantling and improvising unfold in complex 
and often unstructured and unforeseen ways. Reflecting the longstanding instability and 
churn in institutional and governance arrangements for economic development in 
England (Pike and Tomaney 2009), the analysis demonstrated how LEPs were shaped by 
the preceding episode of regionalisation and regionalism and its dismantling, geographies 
of embedded structures and practices of joint working and partnership, and existing 
strategies and knowledge bases. In combination, LEP agency was framed by the 
establishment of new national government priorities and policy frameworks, tasks, 
funding streams, geographies, organisations, staff and the uncertainty generated by the 
unplanned and incremental unfolding of the Coalition Government’s Local Growth 
agenda. Exhortations of localism alongside limited resources and capability meant the 
LEPs had to experiment, innovate and improvise in trying to interpret and fulfil their 
centrally prescribed and locally inflected roles. 
 
Third, the analytical themes identified to capture the different roles and functions of 
local institutions in local economic development provided a comparative framework 
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systematically to engage diversity and variety at the local scale. In the context of 
particular forms of centralism and localism in England, the analysis demonstrated how 
LEPs were encouraged to utilise local knowledge to diagnose economic growth potential, 
develop tailored strategies, and co-ordinate local and central actors to stimulate economic 
growth within their LEP areas. In a centrally prescribed and orchestrated framework, 
LEPs have attempted to lead and integrate decision-making as well as generate, pool and 
direct complex and varied modes of funding. The analytical themes provided a 
systematic means to interpret how the 39 LEPs undertook such tasks. The framework 
provided a heuristic device applicable across the different geographical settings of the 39 
LEP areas to inform explanation of local institutional agency in economic development. 
It is a starting point rather than a comprehensive check-list given that other roles and 
functions could be evident elsewhere. What particular combinations of such roles and 
functions exist in different geographical contexts reinforces the need for further 
comparative work internationally.  
 
Although diversity and variety across a range of dimensions is marked amongst the 39 
LEPs in England, their role and contribution is being compromised by a fragmented and 
shifting landscape of economic development governance and the absence of a longer-
term vision and plan for their evolution. Concerns are being generated by unresolved 
tensions between centralism and localism, competition and collaboration, agility and 
‘bureaucratisation’, and whether or not the ‘LEP Family’ develops a more coherent 
collective voice and begins to articulate its interests with central government. These 
issues are being exacerbated by the existence of differential and overlapping approaches 
to functional economic geographies amongst the LEPs. Given the lack of long-term 
vision and strategy for their development, the fundamental tensions yet to be resolved 
and their institutional deficits and limitations in authority, accountability, capability and 
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resources, at this stage in their evolution, the comparative analysis of the 39 LEPs 
suggest that many will struggle to exercise substantive influence upon economic 
development at the local level. Continued state austerity, faltering growth and uncertain 
economic conditions in the short and medium-term will further trouble this central task. 
 
Conceptual development and analysis can be drawn towards attempting to address the 
difficult normative question of what should be the appropriate type, scale and nature of 
the institutional environment and arrangements for economic development at the local 
level in particular geographical contexts. But, adding a further episode to the history of 
recurrent changes in economic development governance, the experience of LEPs in 
England raises the spectre that such manifestations and configurations of institutions are 
to a large degree contingent and conditional. They are what Gertler (2010: 2) terms 
“locally distinctive and evolving, multi-scalar institutional architectures”. Such 
institutional configurations may be temporary accomplishments that are fleetingly 
appropriate and effective in delivering particular desired outcomes only when they 
coincide and inter-relate with other factors such as international and national economic 
conditions, political support and adequate resources. The same institutional architectures 
can quickly be rendered inappropriate and ineffective obstacles to adaptation, liable to 
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Table 1: Formal and informal institutions in local economic development 
 
Type of institution Formal Informal 
Form ‘Hard’, codified, written ‘Soft’, tacit, unwritten 









Routines, Traditions and 
Values 
Local economic 
development examples  
Decentralisation of 
economic development 
powers, responsibilities and 
resources to a local agency; 
Local content and sourcing 
regulations in public 
procurement contracts; 
Compulsory purchase 
powers for land acquisition 
and ownership 
High levels of trust between 
local actors facilitating 
knowledge exchange and 
innovation; Strong social 
capital bonding local actors 
into existing patterns of 
behaviour; Relational social 
networks connecting local 
actors to extra-local sources 
of growth and innovation 
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Source: Adapted from Pike (2010) 
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Figure 2: Local Enterprise Partnerships, 2013   
 
 
Source: © Crown Copyright 
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Table 5: Main organisations involved in local economic development in LEP 
areas in England 
 
Level England 
Central Government National Government Departments (e.g. BIS, CLG, DEFRA, 
DECC, DfT, HMT) 
Sub-national Offices of Central Government Departments (e.g. 
BIS Local, CLG RGF/ERDF local teams) 
Central government functional agencies (e.g. HCA, HEFCE, 
Highways Agency, TSB, UKTI) 
 
Local Government Local Authorities 
Local Authority groups (e.g. Combined Authorities, Joint 
Committees) 




Local Development Agencies 
Local Enterprise Agencies 
Regeneration Partnerships 
Special Purpose Vehicles 
Local Asset-Backed Vehicles 
 
Training and Skills Skills Funding Agency 
National Apprenticeship Service 
Jobcentre Plus 
Employers (Employer Ownership of Skills Project) 
Work Programme providers 
 
Higher Education Universities 
 
 




Trades Unions Regional TUCs 
 
Private Sector Individual business people 
Business associations (e.g. Chambers of Commerce, CBI, EEFs 
Private sector service providers (e.g. economic development, 
planning, training) 
Industry groups (e.g. Energy, Manufacturing, Construction and 
Infrastructure) 
 




Source: Authors’ research 	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Figure 3: Board size and membership by LEP area, 2013 
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Figure 4: GVA per head by LEP area, 2011 
 
Source: ONS and The LEP Network Annual Review of LEP Economies 2013	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Figure 5: GPF allocations by GVA per capita of LEP area, 2011 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CLG data. 
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Figure 6: RGF (£) Awarded to LEPs (Rounds 1-3) by Per Capita* 
 
* Analysis of BIS data on RGF Bids awarded to LEPs in Rounds 1-3. 
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Figure 7: Combined GPF, RGF and EU Structural & Investment Fund Resources 
under the ‘Strategic Influence’ of LEPs in £m (2011-2020/21) 
 
* Figures for RGF are based on estimates of the allocations in Rounds 1-3. EU 
Structural and Investment Fund allocations have been published in € and have been 
converted to £ using the exchange rate of 0.8627 as of 15 July 2013. Up to 2% of GPF 
funding can be spent on programme management, which is envisaged to support LEP 
and partner capacity. 
 
Source: HMG figures and Authors’ own estimates 
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Figure 8: Estimated Number of Direct Staff by LEP Area, 2013 
 
Source: Authors’ survey 	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